Using unique data on conflict-related incidents in the Philippines, we exploit seasonal variation in the relationship between rainfall and agricultural production to learn about the mechanism through which rainfall affects civil conflict. We find that above-average rainfall in the dry season increases agricultural production and, with a one-year lag, dampens conflict intensity. In contrast, above-average rainfall in the wet season is harmful to crops and leads to more conflict the following year. Consistent with the hypothesis that rebel groups gain strength after a bad harvest, there is evidence that lagged rainfall affects the number of violent incidents initiated by insurgents but not the number of incidents initiated by government forces. These results suggest that the predicted shift towards wetter wet seasons and drier dry seasons will lead to more civil conflict even if annual rainfall totals remain stable. We conclude by noting that policies aimed at mitigating the effect of climate change on agriculture could have the added benefit of reducing civil conflict.
Introduction
Climate change poses multiple threats to national security, global stability and human welfare (IPCC, 2014; Department of Defense, 2014; USAID, 2014) . One of these threats takes the form of changes in the spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall. In fact, there is strong evidence that climate change is already leading to wetter wet seasons and drier dry seasons (Chou et al., 2013) , and this trend is predicted to intensify in the near future (Chou and Lan, 2012) . Experts worry that changing rainfall patterns could lead to more civil conflict, defined as intra-country violence between government forces and an organized armed group (Department of Defense, 2014; USAID, 2014) . However, despite its importance, the connection between rainfall and civil conflict is not well understood (Nardulli et al., 2015; USAID, 2009 USAID, , 2014 .
Using unique data based on incident reports produced by Philippine military units operating in the field, the current study explores the effect of rainfall by season on agricultural production and civil conflict. Our results provide evidence that rainfall is related to civil conflict, at least in part, through its effect on agriculture as opposed to, for instance, its effect on infrastructure. Moreover, they suggest that the predicted shift towards wetter wet seasons and drier dry seasons will lead to an increase in civil conflict.
While there is strong and consistent evidence that hotter temperatures lead to increases in civil conflict , the evidence with regard to rainfall has been mixed. For instance, using data on sub-Saharan African countries, Miguel et al. (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2011) found that rainfall spurs economic growth, which in turn reduces the risk of civil conflict. In contrast, Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) found that abnormally wet years are associated with more civil conflict, while Burke et al. (2009) and Buhaug (2010) found no evidence of a relationship between rainfall and civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 60 studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013) , 11 considered the effect of rainfall on civil conflict.
Four of these studies found that below-average rainfall was associated with increased civil conflict, 6 found a statistically insignificant relationship (at the 5% level), and one found evidence that above-average rainfall was associated with an increase in civil conflict.
Even among researchers who have found an effect of rainfall on conflict, there is disagreement as to the underlying mechanism. Some researchers have argued that rainfall is related to civil conflict through agricultural production (Miguel et al., 2004; Miguel and Satyanath, 2011; Maystadt and Ecker, 2014; Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014) . Alternatively, rainfall could have direct psychological effects on combatants, or be related to civil conflict through its impact on roads, bridges and the availability of surface water (Witsenburg and Adano, 2013; Ciucci et al., 2011; Hiltunen et al., 2012; Sarsons, 2013; Hsiang and Burke, 2014) .
Disentangling these mechanisms is crucial to informing policy responses to climate change (Burke et al., 2015) . Even under the most optimistic scenarios, substantial changes in the spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall appear to be unavoidable (IPCC, 2014, p.189) and designing policies that can increase societal resilience to these changes will become increasingly important (World Bank, 2012 ; Center for Naval Analyses, 2014; USAID, 2014) .
Previous studies document that, in the Philippines, above-average rainfall during the wet season (May through October) has a negative effect on agricultural production, while aboveaverage rainfall during the dry season (November-April) has a positive effect (Lansigan et al., 2000; Gerpacio et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2009) . We hypothesize that, if agricultural production is in fact the mechanism through which rainfall affects civil conflict, then the relationship between rainfall and civil conflict should also exhibit seasonality but in the opposite direction. Using annual data on corn and rice harvests at the province level for the period 2001-2009, we begin our analysis by confirming that the effect of rainfall on agricultural production exhibits the expected seasonality. Next, we turn our attention to estimating the effect of rainfall by season on civil conflict using data based on incident reports produced by Philippine military units. These reports were used to plan operations and are an unusually reliable source of information on the civil conflict in the Philippines (Berman et al., 2011; Crost et al., 2014) .
Lending support to the argument that rainfall is related to civil conflict through agricultural production, we show that above-average rainfall in the wet season is associated with more conflict in the following year, while above-average rainfall in the dry season is associated with less conflict in the following year. This pattern of results is not consistent with the argument that heavy rains hinder the movements of troops or supplies. It is especially pronounced in rice-producing provinces; where corn is the primary crop, and in provinces with relatively little land under cultivation, the relationship between lagged rain and conflict does not exhibit as much seasonality.
Because our conflict data are especially rich, we are able to examine the effect of rainfall on which group (the insurgents or government forces) initiated a particular incident. We find that lagged rainfall is related to the number of incidents initiated by insurgents but has essentially no effect on incidents initiated by government forces. We note that above-average rainfall during the previous rainy season could decrease the opportunity cost of joining an insurgent group and, as a result, increase insurgent strength, while above-average rainfall during the previous dry season could have the opposite effect. Finally, we find that much of the violence attributable to rainfall is directed at civilians, although violence directed at government forces is also affected.
The basic results outlined above have several important implications for policymakers interested in anticipating and bolstering societal resilience to climate change. First, they provide evidence, heretofore lacking, that the predicted shift towards wetter wet seasons and drier dry seasons will lead to more civil conflict even if annual rainfall totals remain stable. Analyses that do not account for changes in the seasonal distribution of rainfall are, therefore, likely to underestimate the true effect of climate change on civil conflict. Second, they suggest that policies aimed at mitigating the effect of climate change on agricultural production could have the added benefit of reducing civil conflict. Finally, our results provide evidence for a link between rainfall and civil conflict using data from the densely populated region of Southeast Asia in a literature that has, thus far, focused almost exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa. 1 2. Background 2.1. Climate change, rainfall and conflict Research on the relationship between rainfall and civil conflict has generally focused on Africa (Miguel et al., 2004; Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010; Miguel and Satyanath, 2011; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; O'Loughlin et al., 2012; Theisen, 2012) . However, observers have argued that climate change is likely to intensify several on-going conflicts, and lead to new conflicts, in Southeast Asia (Smith, 2007; Jasparro and Taylor, 2008; Gerstl and Helmke, 2012; Jasparro and Taylor, 2011) .
Indeed, as climate change progresses, many parts of Southeast Asia are likely to receive more precipitation in the rainy season and less precipitation in the dry season (Christensen et al., 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2009; Lyon and Camargo, 2009) . Unless new varieties of rice with resistance to heat and water stress are developed (or other technological solutions 1 While a handful of studies have examined the effect of rainfall and temperature on other forms of violence in Asia such as ethnic riots (Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010; Sarsons, 2013) and historical peasant revolts (Jia, 2014) , all four studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013) that found a statistically significant effect of rainfall on civil conflict, defined as intra-country conflict between government forces and an armed organization, analyzed data from sub-Saharan Africa. After the publication of Hsiang et al. (2013 ), Fetzer (2014 found a negative relationship between monsoon rainfall and civil conflict in India. are adopted), rice yields in Southeast Asia will decline substantially (Lansigan et al., 2000; Fischer et al., 2005; Lansigan, 2005; Asian Development Bank, 2009; Ahmed and Suphachalasai, 2014) . It is an open question whether this decline in rice yields will lead to more civil conflict.
Only two previous studies have examined the relationship between rainfall and civil conflict in Asia. Using data from India for the period 2000 -2006 , Fetzer (2014 found a negative relationship between monsoon rainfall and civil conflict. Using data from 26 Asian countries for the period 1951 -2008 , Wischnath and Buhaug (2014 found little evidence that civil conflict is sparked by lack of rain, perhaps because Asian economies and/or farmers are less reliant on traditional agricultural practices than their African counterparts. Although Wischnath and Buhaug (2014) concluded that the onset of civil conflict in Asia is unrelated to rainfall and drought, they noted that climate "may shape the severity, duration, and geographic spread of hostilities" (p. 719).
There are several reasons why abnormal rainfall events could affect the duration or intensity of ongoing civil conflicts. While agricultural production is perhaps the most frequently cited mechanism in the literature, other explanations have been suggested. It is, for example, possible that heavy rainfall makes roads and bridges impassable, thereby increasing the cost of carrying out long-distance attacks or impeding state security efforts (Sarsons, 2013; Hsiang and Burke, 2014; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . In addition, above-average rainfall could increase the density of vegetation, allowing combatants to conceal their activities (Witsenburg and Adano, 2013) . The mechanism through which rainfall affects civil conflict has important implications for the optimal policy responses to climate change. If agriculture is the mechanism, then policies aimed at reducing the impact of rainfall shocks on crop yields are likely to increase societal resilience to civil conflict in the face of climate change. These policies include investments in irrigation, crop diversification and breeding programs for increased resistance to water stress. If, on the other hand, infrastructure and/or vegetation density explain the relationship between rainfall and civil conflict, then such policies will have little impact on societal resilience.
Consistent with the argument that agricultural production links rainfall and civil conflict, Harari and La Ferrara (2014) found that weather shocks (such as above-average temperatures or below-average rainfall) during the growing season had a larger impact on conflict-related incidents in Africa than weather shocks outside of the growing season.
2 In an effort to explore the link between rainfall and Hindu-Muslim riots in India, Sarsons (2013) exploited the fact that agricultural production downstream from dams is more likely to depend on irrigation as compared to upstream production. She hypothesized that the effect of rainfall on HinduMuslim riots should, therefore, be less pronounced in downstream districts, but found little evidence for this hypothesis. In fact, the relationship was strongest in downstream districts, suggesting that rainfall is related to Hindu-Muslim riots through a mechanism other than agricultural production.
Our empirical strategy is inspired by Harari and La Ferrara (2014) and Sarsons (2013) . We hypothesize that if rainfall were related to conflict through infrastructure (by, for instance, increasing the cost of travel), then its effect should be immediate, negative and more pronounced during the wet, as opposed to the dry, season. While our results provide some evidence of a contemporaneous relationship between wet-season rainfall and conflict, the main effect of rainfall occurs with a one-year lag and follows a seasonal pattern consistent with an agricultural mechanism. Specifically, above-average rainfall in the wet season is associated with an increase in civil conflict one year later, while above average-rainfall in the dry season is associated with a decrease in civil conflict one year later. This pattern of results is difficult to reconcile with the infrastructure hypothesis, but easily explained by the well-documented seasonality (Lansigan et al., 2000; Gerpacio et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2009) in the relationship between rainfall and Philippine agricultural production.
Agriculture and rainfall in the Philippines
Agriculture is an important part of Philippine economy, employing 35 percent of workers and generating 13 percent of GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2015 . The most important crop is rice, which is the main source of income and employment for 11.5 million farming households (Sebastian et al., 2000) . Rice supplies 35 percent of caloric intake for the average household, and 60-65 percent of caloric intake for households in the lowest income quartile (David and Balisacan, 1995) . In 2002, 42 percent of land under cultivation was planted in rice. The second most important grain crop in the Philippines is corn, which accounted for 25 percent of the land under cultivation. Unlike rice, which is almost exclusively grown as a food crop, corn is mostly used as feed for livestock (Gerpacio et al., 2004) .
There are two distinct growing seasons for cereal crops in most of the Philippines -a wet season lasting from May to October, and a dry season lasting from April to November (Lansigan et al., 2000) . In the wet season, peak planting months are May through July and peak harvesting months are September through November. In the dry season, peak planting months are December and January and peak harvesting months are March and
April.
3 The greatest risk to crops in the wet season is flooding and extreme weather events such as typhoons; as a consequence, above-average rainfall in this season is associated with lower agricultural production (Lansigan et al., 2000; Gerpacio et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2009 ). In the dry season, the greatest risk to crops is drought; above-average rainfall in this season is associated with higher agricultural production . Below, using annual data on corn and rice harvests at the province level from the Philippine Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, we confirm that the relationship between rainfall and agricultural production exhibits the expected seasonality.
Civil conflict in the Philippines
The Philippines is involved in two distinct on-going civil conflicts during the period examined by this study, which together have caused more than 120,000 deaths (Schiavo-Campo and 
Data
Our analysis is at the province-year level. (2011) and Crost et al. (2014) to study the determinants of conflict in the Philippines. Because the reports were used by the armed forces to plan operations and were not originally intended for public release, they are an unusually reliable source of information on the civil conflict (Berman et al., 2011; Crost et al., 2014) . They include information on which group (the government or the insurgents) initiated the incident, the number combatants killed, and the number of civilians killed.
We calculated two measures of conflict intensity from these data. The first is equal to the number of casualties by province and year. The second is equal to the number of violent incidents, defined as incidents resulting in at least one casualty. Regressions using this latter measure are less likely to be influenced by outliers because they give less weight to single incidents with above-average casualty counts.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits the seasonal pattern of rainfall in the Philippines. Our baseline estimating equation for agricultural production is:
where Y it denotes the natural logarithm of rice or corn production in province i and year t. R it denotes annual rainfall levels in 10s of centimeters and X it is a vector of controls for average annual temperature and typhoon activity. Specifically, X it includes a set of indicators for 1-degree Celsius bins fully interacted with indicators for the country's four major geographic zones (Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, and ARMM). The vector X it also includes an indicator for whether the province was hit by a typhoon in year t.
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Next, we allow rainfall to have different effects depending on the season by estimating the following equation:
where R dry it and R wet it measure rainfall dry season and wet season rainfall levels in 10s of centimeters, respectively. To estimate the effect of rainfall on conflict, we use a distributed lag model following Burke et al. (2015) :
where C it denotes the conflict outcome of interest, which is either the number of casualties or the number of violent incidents (defined as incidents with at least one casualty) in province i and year t. Including lagged rainfall accounts for the possibility that the effect of rainfall is not realized until after the next harvest due to storage and savings (Burke et al., 2015) .
As explained in Section 2, we define the wet season as May through October and the remaining months as the dry season. We follow standard practice by using total rainfall received in province i over the course of a season (e.g. Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; Lobell and Burke, 2008; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Schlenker and Lobell, 2010) . This aggregation allows us to capture seasonal variation in the effect of rainfall while reducing the influence of measurement error typically observed in monthly rainfall estimates.
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To control for unobservables potentially correlated with rainfall, our estimating equations include province fixed effects (ν i ) and province-specific linear time trends (λ i t). Following standard practice in this literature, we do not include year fixed effects in our estimating equation (Miguel et al., 2004; Burke et al., 2009; Schlenker and Lobell, 2010; Hsiang et al., 2011) . While year fixed effects would allow us to more flexibly control for time-varying unobservables at the country level, they have two significant disadvantages in this context (Fisher et al., 2012; Aufhammer et al., 2013) . First, year fixed effects can severely exacerbate the problem of measurement error in the rainfall variable. Rainfall is always measured with error, especially when it comes from large-scale gridded datasets like the TRMM, and year fixed effects remove a substantial part of the actual variation in rainfall, which can severely increase the ratio of noise to signal and lead to attenuation bias (Fisher et al., 2012) . Second, year fixed effects can introduce bias in the presence of spillovers from trade, migration, or movements of insurgents across province boundaries. To avoid these issues, our regressions exclude year fixed effects and rely on the assumption that variation in rainfall is random across years and therefore uncorrelated with time-varying common shocks that affected the country as a whole. To account for possible serial correlation of conflict, we cluster the standard errors at the province level. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for rainfall (by season), agricultural production, conflictrelated incidents and casualties. It is apparent from these statistics that rainfall exhibits strong seasonality. During the dry season, the provinces in our sample received an average of 98.6 centimeters of rainfall; during the wet season, they received an average of 159.3 centimeters of rainfall, a difference of approximately 60 percent. The optimal seasonal rainfall for rice production in Asia is between 100 and 150 centimeters (Samui, 1999; IRRI, 2015b) , consistent with evidence from the Philippines that above-average rainfall in the dry season increases yields while above-average rainfall in the wet season has the opposite effect (Lansigan et al., 2000; Gerpacio et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2009 ).
Results
On average, provinces experienced 6.6 conflict-related incidents per year, resulting in 14.1
casualties. Approximately 45 percent of total casualties were suffered by government forces; 30 percent were suffered by insurgents, with civilians making up the remainder. Sixty-two percent of casualty-producing incidents were initiated by insurgents, and insurgent-initiated 8 We also estimated the spatial autocorrelation robust standard errors described by Conley (2008) and previously implemented by Hsiang (2010) . Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 show that the Conley standard errors are smaller than clustered standard errors and insensitive to the choice of spatial bandwidth, which suggests that spatial correlation does not lead to a downward bias in our standard error estimates.
incidents accounted for 55 percent of total casualties. Government-initiated incidents accounted for 44 percent of total casualties.
Disaggregation by insurgent group shows that the largest share of incidents (61 percent) involved the New People's Army (NPA). Incidents involving the NPA accounted for 58 percent of total casualties. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was involved in 10 percent of reported violent incidents, although these incidents accounted for 18 percent of casualties. Lawless Elements (LE) were responsible for 22 percent of incidents and 20 percent of total casualties. Finally, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was involved in less than 1 percent of violent incidents, accounting for less than 2 percent of casualties. Table 2 provides estimates of the relationship between rainfall and agricultural production.
Rainfall and agricultural production
In column (1), the estimated coefficient of R it is small and statistically insignificant at conventional levels, suggesting that total rainfall received over the course of the year has little effect on rice production. In column (3), the relationship between annual rainfall and corn production is negative and significant: a 10-centimeter increase in annual rainfall is associated with a decrease in corn production of 0.59 percent.
When R it is replaced by R wet it and R dry it , the expected seasonal pattern emerges, at least with regard to the rice harvest. Specifically, a 10-centimeter increase in dry-season rainfall is associated with a 0.28 percent increase in rice production.
10 In contrast, a 10-centimeter increase in wet-season rainfall is associated with a decrease in rice production of 0.56 percent.
Both estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.
A slightly different seasonal pattern emerges for corn. The estimated relationship between dry-season rainfall and corn production is positive, but not statistically significant. A 10-centimeter increase in wet-season rainfall is associated with a decrease in corn production of approximately 1.5 percent. This latter estimate is significant at the 1 percent level, and the difference between the wet-and dry-season estimates is also significant at the 1 percent level.
The results in Table 2 are generally consistent with what we know about the physiology of rice versus corn (Rathore et al., 1997; Zaidi et al., 2004; Nishiuchi et al., 2012) . Rice is a wetland plant and, as a consequence, more tolerant to waterlogging. Corn is better adapted to drier conditions, but more susceptible to flooding and submersion in water.
Rainfall and civil conflict
We report estimates of equation (3) in Table 3 . Consistent with the infrastructure hypothesis, wet-season rainfall appears to have a contemporaneous, but relatively modest, impact on conflict intensity. Specifically, a 10-centimeter increase in wet-season rainfall is associated with 0.12 fewer conflict-related incidents. The estimated relationship between contemporaneous wet-season rainfall and total casualties is also negative, but not significant at the 10 percent level.
Consistent with the hypothesis that rainfall affects conflict intensity, at least in part, through agricultural production, we find that a 10-centimeter increase in dry-season rainfall is associated with 0.55 fewer casualties and 0.24 fewer conflict-related incidents the following year.
1.4 percent increase in rice production. Using farm-level data from India, Bhattacharya and Panda (2013) found that a one-standard deviation increase in rainfall was associated with a 1.9 percent increase in yield. It should also be kept in mind that, because rainfall is measured with error, the estimates in Table 2 can be thought of as lower bounds.
A 10-centimeter increase in wet-season rainfall is associated with 0.25 additional conflictrelated incidents the following year. The estimated relationship between lagged wet-season rainfall and casualties, while positive, is not significant at the 10 percent level.
As noted above, several provinces in the Philippines have three (as opposed to two) growing seasons, while others (located along the country's east coast) lack a pronounced dry season and typically receive heavy rainfall from November through January (IRRI, 2015a; Kintanar, 1984) . 11 As a robustness check, we experimented with excluding these provinces from the analysis. The results, reported in Tables 4 and 5 , are generally consistent with those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . In fact, when provinces without a dry season are excluded, the relationship between rainfall and conflict appears more pronounced.
The Importance of Agricultural Area
Next, we allow the effect of rainfall on conflict to differ according to a measure of land use at the province level, Specifically, we estimate equation (2) separately for provinces with HectaresU nderCultivation i T otalHectares i greater than the median observed in our data, and for provinces with HectaresU nderCultivation i T otalHectares i less than the median observed in our data. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6 and suggest an important role for agriculture: the estimated effects of lagged rainfall on conflict intensity are, without exception, much larger in provinces with a greater-thanmedian proportion of total area devoted to agriculture as compared to provinces with a less-than-median proportion of total area devoted to agriculture.
Disaggregation by initiator and victim
In this section, we investigate the effect of rainfall on conflict intensity by casualty type.
The results, which are reported in Table 7 , suggest that rainfall shocks can shift the balance of power between insurgents and government forces. The estimated effects of rainfall on insurgent casualties and on incidents resulting in at least one insurgent casualty are generally small and, without exception, statistically insignificant. Rainfall does, however, appear to have an impact on casualties suffered by civilians and government forces. For instance, a 10-centimeter increase in lagged dry-season rainfall is associated with 0.27 fewer civilian casualties and 0.28 fewer casualties suffered by government forces; a 10-centimeter increase in lagged wet-season rainfall is associated with 0.30 additional civilian casualties and 0.17 additional incidents resulting in at least one civilian casualty. These results are broadly consistent with those of van den Eynde (2011), who found that low rainfall is associated with an increase in insurgent-on-civilian violence in India.
In Table 8 , we report estimates of the effect of rainfall on conflict intensity by who (that is, which group) initiated the violence. The results provide further evidence that rainfall can shift the power balance between insurgents and government forces. Specifically, we find that the estimated effects of lagged rainfall on violent incidents initiated by insurgents are roughly similar in size to those reported in Table 3 . In contrast, the estimated effects on government-initiated incidents are closer to zero and not statistically significant.
12 This pattern of results suggests that rainfall shocks that are detrimental to agricultural production strengthen insurgent groups, enabling them to inflict casualties on government forces and 12 Table 8 also provides evidence that contemporaneous dry-season rainfall is positively related to incidents initiated by government forces, but negatively related to incidents initiated by insurgents. These estimates, however, are only significant at the 10 percent level.
civilians who do not comply with their demands. 
Disaggregation by insurgent group and region
The Philippine military categorizes incidents based upon which insurgent group was involved.
According to the military, the three main active insurgent groups operating in the Philippines are the communist New People's Army (NPA), the Muslim-separatist Moro-Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). In addition to these armed insurgent groups, the military also reports conflict episodes involving armed criminal groups, or so-called "Lawless Elements", as recorded in military field reports. Lawless Elements (LE) are composed of apolitical criminal organizations and groups led by renegade former insurgent commanders. Detailed descriptions of these four groups can be found in Section 2. In this section, we estimate the effect of rainfall on conflict intensity by region and by which armed group was involved. Our definition of region is based on where the MILF operates. MILF (and ASG) operations are confined to the southwest of the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Sea, while the incidents involving the NPA and Lawless Elements are reported throughout the country.
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The results of this exercise are reported in Table 9 . They suggest that outside the provinces in which the MILF operates, lagged dry-season rainfall is negatively related to the number of violent incidents involving the NPA and lawless elements. In regions with MILF/ASG activity, lagged rainfall appears to have different effects depending on which insurgent group was involved. For example, lagged wet-season rainfall is associated with more incidents involving lawless elements but fewer incidents involving the MILF. A possible explanation is that negative shocks to agricultural production increase the likelihood of factional splits within the MILF. Because the Philippine military classifies smaller armed groups led by renegade MILF commanders as LE, factional splits could result in an increase in incidents attributed to lawless elements and a corresponding decrease in incidents attributed to the MILF. This explanation is consistent with theoretical and empirical results that suggest that poor economic conditions and low state capacity lead to increased factionalization among rebel groups (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008; Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012) .
15 A related explanation is that rainfall shocks affect how military units attribute incidents to the four group categories, even if there is little change in actual insurgent activity. The leadership of NPA and MILF often publicly denounce violence in regions affected by humanitarian crises such as drought or flood. Regardless of their actual affiliation, groups committing violence in these regions may therefore be more likely to be labeled as lawless elements because their actions contradict the public statements of the NPA and MILF leadership.
Conclusion
In the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia, above-average rainfall can be an unexpected boon for farmers or it can ruin crops, depending on when it occurs (Lansigan et al., 2000; Gerpacio et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2009) . During the dry season, rice (and to a lesser extent corn) is susceptible to drought and above-average rainfall typically leads to an increase in agricultural production. During the wet season, above-average rainfall can lead to flooding and/or waterlogging and, as a consequence, poor harvests.
Using detailed data on conflict-related incidents collected by the Philippine military for its own internal purposes, we estimate the effect of rainfall by season on agricultural production and civil conflict in the Philippines. Our results suggest that the predicted shift towards wetter wet seasons and drier dry seasons will be harmful to agriculture and lead to an increase in civil conflict. Moreover, they suggest that rainfall is related to civil conflict, at least in part, through its effect on agriculture.
Three pieces of evidence are most salient. First, we find that lagged rainfall is a robust predictor of conflict intensity. Because the effect of rainfall on agricultural production is realized at harvest, we would expect there to be a lag between rainfall and conflict, which we would not expect if rainfall worked exclusively through infrastructure or if rainfall had a direct influence on the psychology of combatants. Second, the relationship between rainfall and conflict-related incidents exhibits seasonality, but in the opposite direction as observed for agricultural production. That is, above-average rainfall received during the dry season leads to an increase in rice production, but is associated with fewer conflict-related incidents and causalities one year later. In contrast, above-average rainfall received during the wet season leads to a decrease in rice production, but is associated with more conflict-related incidents one year later. Third and finally, the effect of rainfall on conflict appears to be more pronounced in provinces with a greater-than-median proportion of total area devoted to the production of rice. Taken together, these results lend strong support to the argument that agricultural production is at least one of the channels through which rainfall impacts civil conflict.
Although climate change is not expected to have a major impact on total rainfall in Philippines or other Southeast Asian countries (Christensen et al., 2007; Asian Development Bank, 2009; Lyon and Camargo, 2009) , it is expected to amplify the already pronounced seasonal variation in rainfall. Our findings suggest that this amplification will exacerbate ongoing civil conflict in the Philippines and perhaps spark new conflict in other Southeast Asian countries, especially those heavily dependent on rice for subsistence.
Understanding the mechanisms through which climate change affects civil conflict is crucial to informing policy responses to climate change (Burke et al., 2015) . Even under the most optimistic scenarios, substantial climate change appears to be unavoidable (IPCC, 2014, p.189) , and designing policies that can increase societal resilience against civil conflict in the face of a changing climate will become increasingly important (World Bank, 2012; Center for Naval Analyses, 2014; USAID, 2014 The unit of observation is the province-year. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. Standard errors, clustered at the province level, are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. Standard errors, clustered at the province level, are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. Standard errors, clustered at the province level, are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. Standard errors, clustered at the province level, are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. The variables and denote the mean fraction of the province's land area that is planted to rice and corn during the period of observation, 2001-2009. Standard errors, clustered at the province level, are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. Standard errors, clustered at the province level, are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include province fixed effects, province-specific linear time trends and the temperature and typhoon controls described in Section 4. Standard errors are robust to spatial and temporal autocorrelation, as described by Conley (2008) and implemented by Hsiang (2010) . ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
